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Abstract 
 
 
We explain the lack of long-term performance persistence by actively managed U.S. equity 
mutual funds in terms of two equilibrating mechanisms: fund flows and manager changes. We 
find that these mechanisms acting together affect the future performance of past outperforming 
(winner) funds and past underperforming (loser) funds. Fund flows in isolation have a significant 
effect on performance, whereas manager changes in isolation have only a limited effect. A 
combination of both fund flows and manager changes has a substantial impact on future fund 
performance. If neither of these equilibrating mechanisms is operating, winner funds continue to 
significantly outperform loser funds by 4.08 percentage points per annum. However, the 
difference between winner and loser funds declines to almost zero if the two mechanisms are 
acting together. We also document that managers of winner funds increase risk, while managers 
of loser funds reduce risk, although losers who are fired took more risk than losers who keep their 
jobs. 
 
JEL Classification: G28, G29, G32. 
Keywords: Mutual funds, performance persistence, fund flows, manager changes. 
 
                                                 
 
*
 Wolfgang Bessler, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Center for Finance and Banking, Wolfgang.Bessler 
@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de, +49 641 9922460; David Blake, Cass Business School, The Pensions Institute, 
D.Blake@city.ac.uk, +44 20 70408600; Peter Lückoff, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Center for Finance and 
Banking, Peter@Lueckoff.de; Ian Tonks, University of Bath, School of Management, I.Tonks@bath.ac.uk, +44 1225 
384842. Part of this research was undertaken while Peter Lückoff was a visiting research fellow at Xfi Centre for 
Finance and Investment, University of Exeter and a junior research fellow at The Pensions Institute, Cass Business 
School. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). For 
valuable comments and suggestions we thank Gordon Alexander, Wolfgang Drobetz, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, 
Lee M. Dunham, Iwan Meier, Harald Lohre, Jerry T. Parwada, Guillermo Baquero, Andrei Shleifer, Mungo Wilson. 
Errors remain the responsibility of the authors. 
1 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that equity mutual fund performance does not persist in the long 
term, even though some studies indicate that short-term persistence exists.1 Two alternative 
explanations for the lack of long-term persistence are fund flows (Berk and Green, 2004) and 
manager changes (Khorana, 1996, 2001; Dangl, Wu and Zechner, 2008). In this paper, we 
investigate how far these two “equilibrating mechanisms”2 explain mean reversion in mutual 
fund performance and whether they interact as substitutes or complements. If they are 
complements, then they should be more effective in preventing performance persistence when 
operating together. If they are substitutes, then the incremental effect of one mechanism, 
conditional on the other operating, should be close to zero. In fact, we find that the two 
mechanisms act as complements for both past outperforming (winner) and past underperforming 
(loser) funds, based on a sample of 6,207 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the 
period from 1992 to 2011. For both outperforming and underperforming funds we find that 
manager changes reinforce the effect of fund flows and can explain the erosion of performance 
persistence.  
For winner funds, we find that those funds experiencing both of the equilibrating 
mechanisms – having relatively high net inflows and a manager change – underperform those 
winner funds in which neither mechanism operates by 0.19 percentage points per month (2.28 
                                                 
 
1
 See, e.g., Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Carhart (1997) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) for long-
term performance persistence and Bollen and Busse (2005), Busse and Irvine (2006) and Huij and Verbeek (2007) 
for short-term performance persistence. Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) document a similar pattern for 
institutional funds. 
2
 This terminology was introduced by Berk and Green (2004, p. 1271). 
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percentage points per annum)3 on a risk-adjusted basis in the following year. We find that fund 
flows are the dominant reason for the lack of superior long-term performance persistence 
amongst winner funds. However, the two mechanisms are complementary, since, in 
combination, manager changes and fund flows result in an additional deterioration of 
performance. Further, we provide evidence that winner funds increase their risk exposure.  
For loser funds, as predicted by Dangl et al. (2008), we also detect a strong interaction 
effect between both mechanisms. Manager changes, interpreted as an “internal governance” 
mechanism, and outflows, treated as an “external governance” mechanism, reinforce each other 
and the combined effect is a 0.16 percentage points per month (1.92 percentage points per 
annum) higher risk-adjusted performance for loser funds experiencing both forms of governance 
relative to funds experiencing neither. Both mechanisms are rather weak when operating in 
isolation. Thus, while winner funds suffer from fund inflows irrespective of what happens to the 
manager, the performance of loser funds is only affected when both mechanisms operate 
together. Further, we confirm the prediction in Dangl et al. (2008) that, prior to a manager 
change, fund risk increases, but falls post-replacement. 
We go on to examine the spread in subsequent 12-month performance between winner 
and loser funds, and we identify an unconditional spread of 0.22 percentage points per month 
(2.64 percentage points per annum) in alphas, similar to the results in Carhart (1997). By 
conditioning only on winner and loser funds that do not experience either of the equilibrating 
mechanisms, our results produce a highly significant winner-minus-loser spread of 0.34 
percentage points per month (4.08 percentage points per annum) in the subsequent year. In 
                                                 
 
3
 We report fund performance in percent/ percentage points per month throughout the paper as our analysis is based 
on monthly fund returns (except for section 4.6 where the regression analysis involves annualized changes in 
performance). However, for comparison with other studies, we add percent/ percentage points per annum in 
parentheses in the introduction and conclusion. 
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contrast, by conditioning on winner and loser funds experiencing both equilibrating 
mechanisms, the corresponding spread narrows to an insignificant -0.02 percentage points per 
month (-0.24 percentage points per annum), implying that the substantial difference in alphas of 
1.71 percentage points per month (20.52 percentage points per annum) between winner and 
loser funds in the portfolio formation period is completely eliminated in the evaluation period. 
These results indicate that a combination of both fund flows and manager changes explain the 
lack of performance persistence and the mean reversion in mutual fund performance. We find 
that performance persists when funds are not exposed to at least one equilibrating mechanism.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a review of the 
literature and our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our data set and explain our research 
methodology. Our results are discussed in section 4. Using ranked portfolio tests, we analyze 
fund flows, manager changes and their interaction for winner and loser funds separately, and 
then examine the spread in winner-loser performance, before finally undertaking robustness 
checks, including a pooled regression approach. Section 5 concludes and discusses the 
implications of our findings. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Berk and Green (2004) argue that mutual fund market equilibrium is attained through fund 
flows. These respond to past performance, but due to decreasing returns to scale in active fund 
management, the growth in fund size of recent winner funds causes their performance to 
deteriorate, while loser-fund performance benefits from withdrawals that force managers to re-
optimize their portfolios. Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008) find that transaction costs are 
positively correlated with fund size and the degree of illiquidity of the investment strategy and 
that small funds outperform large funds. However, this is only an indirect test of the Berk and 
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Green (2004) hypothesis. Although the finding that small funds outperform large funds is 
consistent with decreasing returns to scale in fund management, differences in fund sizes are the 
result of both external growth due to the inflows accumulated throughout a fund’s full history 
since inception and internal growth due to differential performance. Consequently, we focus 
only on the most recent year’s fund flows as a flow variable, rather than fund size, to analyze its 
equilibrium effect. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Lynch and Musto (2003) document that past 
outperformance triggers large inflows, but that investors in poorly performing funds typically 
fail to withdraw their investments. Explanations for such behavior include: the anticipation of a 
strategy change by the incumbent manager, the firing of a poorly performing manager, a 
disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Singal and Xu, 2011), and investor inertia (Berk 
and Tonks, 2007). 
Edelen (1999), Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007) and Dubofsky (2010) argue that 
excessive inflows or outflows encourage liquidity-motivated rather than valuation-motivated 
trading by the managers subject to these flows and induce immediate transaction costs, both of 
which are detrimental to short-run fund performance. Rakowski (2010) reports that funds with 
more volatile flows underperform those with less volatile flows, which implies that outflows can 
be as harmful for future performance as inflows, a finding that is incompatible with Berk and 
Green’s (2004) conjecture that underperforming funds benefit from withdrawals. Even worse, 
large outflows result in liquidity-motivated fire sales which distort fund performance and 
impose even higher costs on loser funds (Coval and Stafford, 2007). Thus, we anticipate 
asymmetric effects of fund flows on loser funds and winner funds, and we analyze each group 
separately. 
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Khorana (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Gallagher and Nadarajah (2004) 
document an inverse relationship between fund performance and manager changes. Star fund 
managers can extract a larger share of the higher fee income by either moving to a larger fund 
within the same organization or to another fund family (Hu, Hall, and Harvey, 2000). Moreover, 
a successful manager anticipating that she will be unable to repeat her outstanding performance 
in the future may decide to use her current favorable track record to find a higher-paid job with a 
new fund management company. In this case, the decision to stay or to leave will be the result of 
the manager’s own assessment of her investment skill. The winner fund that loses its star 
manager will need to hire a new manager, presumably with lower skills. Therefore, we would 
expect fund performance to deteriorate after the hiring of a new manager. Khorana (2001) finds 
that a manager change in outperforming funds results in a deterioration in performance from an 
annual 1.9 percent in the pre-replacement period to 0.4 percent in the third year after 
replacement. Loser-fund managers, in contrast, may be demoted to run smaller funds in the 
same family or fired after a sustained period of poor performance. Khorana (2001) reports that 
the performance of recently underperforming funds improves if the manager is replaced, in 
which case abnormal performance rises from an annual -2.40 percent to 0.50 percent in the third 
year after replacement. Hence, manager changes appear to contribute towards rectifying 
negative performance persistence. 
Dangl et al. (2008) develop a theoretical model of the mutual fund industry in which 
poorly performing managers are subject to both external governance through market discipline 
with investors withdrawing funds, and internal governance in the form of manager replacement. 
The new manager also tends to change the fund’s risk profile relative to her predecessor. For 
most parameter values in the calibrated model, there will be capital outflows and an increase in 
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portfolio risk pre-replacement, as the fund manager anticipating a termination of the 
employment contract takes on more risk in the hope of getting lucky (Brown, Harlow and 
Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). After the manager is replaced, the model predicts 
subsequent capital inflows and a decrease in portfolio risk. 
Qiu (2003) and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) suggest that employment risk 
concerns could lead to fund managers taking less risk, while Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011) 
argue that as well as these agency incentives, there are other risk considerations, such as 
unskilled managers making poor investment decisions and skilled managers taking advantage of 
market timing opportunities. Further, behavioral factors may also affect risk shifting behavior. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that successful fund managers will 
become more risk averse. On the other hand, overconfidence has been recognized as influencing 
the behavior of both retail investors (Odean, 1999; and Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009) and 
institutional investors (Ekholm and Pasternack, 2008; Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011; Bar, Kempf and 
Ruenzi, 2011). Overconfidence can be explained by biased self-attrition, whereby individuals 
update their beliefs about their own ability as being attributable to skill following good 
outcomes, but due to bad luck after bad outcomes. They become more overconfident after good 
past performance, but not less confident after bad past performance (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001). 
There exist several reasons to believe that fund flows and manager changes are not 
independent of each other. Both mechanisms will be triggered by past performance, and the 
results of Khorana (2001) that manager changes affect future fund performance might, in part, 
be attributable to the effect of contemporaneous fund flows. Thus, it is important to control for 
this interaction. Moreover, fund flows may have a differential effect on fund performance for 
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new managers as compared with continuing managers. In order to investigate these interaction 
effects in detail, we classify the fund flows and manager change mechanisms as being 
substitutes if the performance impact of one mechanism is smaller when the other mechanism 
operates simultaneously. Fund flows and manager changes are interpreted as being complements 
if the performance impact of one mechanism is larger when it operates jointly with the other 
mechanism. In those cases where the performance impact of each mechanism is the same, 
irrespective of whether it operates separately from or in combination with the other mechanism, 
the mechanisms will be classified as being independent of each other.  
In the case of winner funds, fund flows and manager changes are potential substitutes 
because if net inflows remain low despite superior past performance, the fund manager is in a 
weaker position to negotiate an improved compensation package, increasing the likelihood of 
her leaving.4 In contrast, if the fund is subject to high net inflows, the manager may decide to 
stay and reap the benefits from a larger asset base and hence higher fees. Moreover, if investors 
observe that the star manager has left, they may rationally anticipate that superior past 
performance will be less of a predictor of future performance, resulting in a weaker relationship 
between past performance and current fund flows in the case of a manager change. A further 
reason for these mechanisms being substitutes is that a newly appointed fund manager is likely 
to adjust the portfolio holdings towards her own preferred investment strategy. If large net 
inflows occur at the same time, the manager could use these inflows efficiently to adjust the 
portfolio weights and, by doing so, reduce the marginal negative performance impact of high net 
inflows. 
                                                 
 
4
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some mutual fund managers have increased their personal wealth by quitting 
their job as an employee in the mutual fund industry and setting up a hedge fund, such as Jeffrey N. Vinik, the 
former manager of Fidelity’s Magellan fund, in 1996. 
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Based on the findings of Pollet and Wilson (2008) that fund managers scale up existing 
holdings as a response to inflows, it should be the case that fund flows and manager changes are 
complements among winner funds. Specifically, if managerial skill determines the number of 
“best ideas” a manager is able to generate (Cohen, Polk and Silli, 2010) and the newly hired 
manager has lower skills and hence fewer good ideas than the former manager, then the same 
level of inflows will have a stronger impact on lowering the performance of winner funds with a 
manager change than on those without. 
Whether these mechanisms are substitutes or complements is an empirical question that 
our data set allows us to investigate. We address the following hypotheses and questions about 
the joint effects of fund flows and manager changes on the performance persistence of winner 
funds:  
y Fund flows: Investors chase past performance and future performance suffers from high 
inflows, leading to stronger mean reversion for winner funds with higher net inflows. 
y Manager changes: A fund manager who leaves a winner fund is replaced with a less 
skilled manager, resulting in reduced performance and stronger mean reversion for 
winner funds with a manager change. 
y Interaction: Fund flows and manager changes, when occurring simultaneously, have 
either magnifying (complement) or offsetting (substitute) effects.  
y Risk changes: How does a winning fund manager adjust her subsequent risk exposure? 
According to prospect theory, risk aversion increases in the domain of gains and risk is 
reduced in order to preserve the gains accrued. On the other hand, if fund managers are 
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subject to an overconfidence bias, risk will increase (Barber and Odean, 2001; 
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011). 
With loser funds, the Dangl et al. (2008) model predicts that the internal (termination of 
a manager contract) and external (investors withdraw funds) governance mechanisms are 
potential substitutes. If the manager has been replaced, investors will no longer see any reason 
to withdraw money and instead will remain invested, waiting for a performance reversal. 
Similarly, if money has flowed out of the fund, the management company might decide that the 
existing manager will be able to improve fund performance with the smaller asset base (Berk 
and Green, 2004).  
Alternatively, internal and external governance in loser funds could reinforce each other 
and act as complements. If the market has reacted quickly to poor past performance, the 
management company may fire a poorly performing manager in an attempt to stem outflows. 
Furthermore, causality could be reversed: if the disposition effect explains why many investors 
in poorly performing funds do not withdraw their investments, a manager replacement can serve 
as an attention trigger. Once investors are aware of both the manager change and the 
underperformance, they then start withdrawing funds.5 Cremers and Nair (2005) investigate the 
interaction between internal and external control mechanisms in the context of corporate 
governance, and examine performance differentials between companies where one or both of 
these mechanisms are present. Their results have implications for the incentives and penalties 
facing corporate managers from the two governance mechanisms. Our study has similar 
implications for the incentives and penalties facing fund managers.  
                                                 
 
5
 There is a potential prisoners’ dilemma issue here whereby investors defer withdrawing money from poorly 
performing funds in anticipation of a manager change, but the fund management company delays firing the poorly 
performing fund manager because the outflows have not materialized. 
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As with winner funds, whether these mechanisms for underperforming equity mutual 
funds are substitutes or complements is an empirical question. We address the following 
hypotheses and questions about the effects of fund flows and manager changes on performance 
persistence of loser funds:  
y Fund flows: Investors withdraw their money and performance improves as a result of a 
smaller asset base, since managers can concentrate on the most profitable investment 
opportunities and this leads to stronger mean reversion for loser funds with higher 
outflows, although this effect will be dampened by any investor inertia and by the costs 
of re-optimizing portfolios. 
y Manager changes: The fund management company fires an underperforming fund 
manager and performance improves under a newly appointed fund manager, leading to 
stronger mean reversion for loser funds with a manager change. 
y Interaction: External and internal governance mechanisms, when occurring 
simultaneously, have either magnifying (complement) or offsetting (substitute) effects. 
y Risk changes: Prior to manager replacement, fund risk increases and post-replacement 
fund risk falls (Dangl et al., 2008), although Kempf et al. (2009) predict employment 
risk concerns will lead to fund managers taking less risk.  
Finally, these two sets of hypotheses for winner and loser fund acting jointly have 
implications for the spread in performance persistence between winner and loser funds. Our 
main hypothesis in the paper states that: 
y In the absence of fund flows and manager changes, past winners will continue to 
outperform past losers. 
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We predict that if both equilibrating mechanisms operate on winner and loser funds together, 
then the spread between winner and loser funds’ subsequent performance will be narrower than 
when these mechanisms are not present.  
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. DATA 
Our mutual fund sample from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) starts in 1992, 
the first year for which reliable information on manager changes becomes available, and ends in 
2011. We follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only actively managed U.S. domestic 
equity funds (see Appendix). We aggregate all share classes of the same fund and drop all 
observations prior to the IPO date given by CRSP and funds without names in order to account 
for a potential incubation bias (Evans, 2010). Our final sample consists of 6,207 funds that 
existed at some time during the period from 1992 to 2011 for at least 12 consecutive months. 
These funds have an average fund size of 875 million USD (Table 1). Fund size increased over 
the sample period, whereas average fees fell from 1.45 percent to 1.36 percent of assets under 
management, probably as a result of economies of scale in asset management.6 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Monthly fund flows are constructed from the change in total net assets adjusted for internal 
growth from investment returns:  
(1)   ݂݈݋ݓ௜௧ ൌ ܶܰܣ௜௧ െ ܶܰܣ௜௧ିଵሺͳ ൅ ܴ௜௧ሻ, 
                                                 
 
6
 Fees are calculated as the sum of the annual expense ratio and 1/7th of the sum of the front end and back end loads. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) both assume a seven-year average holding period for 
mutual funds. See French (2008) for an analysis of changes in the fee structure over time. 
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where TNAit refers to the total net assets of fund i at the end of period t and Rit is the return of 
fund i between t-1 and t, assuming that all distributions are reinvested and are net of fund 
expenses. On average, each fund received 2.57 million USD net inflows per month. 
To obtain information on manager changes, we focus on the variable “mgr_date” in the 
CRSP database, instead of using the specific names of the managers.7 This variable provides the 
date of the last manager change as reported by the fund management company. By using the 
manager date variable, we avoid any problems associated with different spellings of manager 
names. Furthermore, as the number of team-managed funds increased during recent years, the 
manager date variable has the advantage that fund management companies only report 
significant changes in manager that are likely to have an impact on performance (Massa, Reuter, 
and Zitzewitz, 2010). A total of 7,919 manager changes occurred during our sample period and, 
on average, 15 percent of the fund managers are replaced each year. 
3.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We use both ranked portfolio tests (Carhart, 1997; Carpenter and Lynch, 1999; Tonks, 2005) 
and pooled regressions to investigate the hypotheses outlined in Section 2.  
3.2.a. RANKED PORTFOLIO TESTS    
Funds are first ranked into equal-weighted decile portfolios based on their previous performance 
over rolling twelve-month periods. Then, in a second sorting of the top-decile-10 and the 
bottom-decile-1 portfolios, we form subgroups based on fund flows (low net inflows / high net 
                                                 
 
7
 This variable has also been used by Lynch and Musto (2003) and Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005). In theory, it 
shows the date that the manager leaves. However, for around 80 percent of observations, this is reported as the first 
of January. For the years 1992 and 1993, the variable is evenly distributed over different months. We conclude 
from this that the variable can only be used as an indicator of the year in which a manager change occurred. One 
implication of this is that our data set is not sufficiently granular to investigate the impact of timing differences 
between fund flows and manager changes on subsequent fund performance. In other words, we are unable to test 
whether fund flows pre-date and hence possibly ‘cause’ a manager change or vice versa. We are only able to 
indicate that there were changes in fund flows as well as a manager change within the same year and then assess 
what effect these had on a fund’s subsequent performance.  
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inflows) or manager changes (with manager change / without manager change), see Figure 1.8 
Furthermore, as we are interested in the interaction effects between both mechanisms, we also 
form subgroups by double sorting on fund flows and manager changes simultaneously (low with 
/ low without / high with / high without). We analyze the performance of these subgroups of top 
and bottom decile portfolios and the performance of spread portfolios in order to compare 
alternative investment strategies.  
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
The decile portfolios are formed (a) on the basis of each fund’s alpha in the previous year or (b) 
on the basis of previous year raw returns. For the first method, funds are ranked by alphas from 
a Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over the previous 12 months (the formation 
period), where the four common factors are the excess return above the risk-free rate on the 
market index ሺݎ௠௧ሻ, the returns on a size factor ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ, a book-to-market factor (ܪܯܮ௧ሻ,  and a 
momentum factor (ܯܱܯ௧).9 Fund excess returns above the risk-free rate accounting for 
different fund styles are given by: 
(2)       ݎ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ௜ݎ௠௧ ൅ ߚଶ௜ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚସ௜ܯܱܯ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
                                                 
 
8
 In Berk and Green (2004), active management suffers from decreasing returns to scale, but it is an empirical 
question whether these capacity constraints are absolute or relative. Absolute capacity constraints arise once a 
certain threshold of absolute fund size is exceeded and depend on absolute fund flows. Relative capacity constraints 
differ across investment strategies and arise after the fund receives a certain level of inflows relative to the initial 
fund size. We analyze both absolute and relative net inflows, but, in the presentation of our results, we concentrate 
on absolute flows because the results for relative fund flows are qualitatively very similar though slightly weaker. 
9
 We also experimented with different five-factor model: first, a five-factor model that adds a mean reversion factor 
(based on six value-weighted portfolios formed on the size and prior returns of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
stocks, and downloaded from Kenneth French’s website: 
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) to the Carhart model: if winner funds hold on 
to winner stocks for another one or two years, these winner stocks might eventually experience mean reversion in 
returns (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987) and second, a five-factor model that adds a liquidity-factor (downloaded 
from Lubos Pastor’s website: faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research) to the Carhart model on the grounds 
that fund flows may also affect portfolio liquidity. However, we only present the results from the four-factor model, 
since the results from the five-factor models were qualitatively similar. 
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To assess performance and fund flows in a timely manner, we focus on the previous 12-
month horizon. Using such a short horizon to estimate alphas from a factor model is problematic 
on account of the low degrees of freedom available for estimating (2). Nevertheless, we are able 
to efficiently estimate (2) over this short horizon by applying the “empirical Bayesian” 
adjustment procedure discussed in Huij and Verbeek (2007, hereafter HV), assuming a 
multivariate normal prior. Let ߠ௜ ൌ ሺߙ௜ , ߚଵ௜ , ߚଶ௜ , ߚଷ௜ , ߚସ௜ሻԢ be a vector of unknown parameters to 
be estimated. The cross-sectional distribution of the funds’ alphas and betas is assumed to be 
normal, ߠ௜~ܰሺߤ,Σሻ, where ߤ is a 5-dimensional vector of cross-sectional means of alphas and 
betas, and Σ  is a 5x5 covariance matrix. Assuming the errors in (2) are ߝ௜௧~ܫܫܰሺͲ, ߪ௜ଶሻ, the 
posterior distribution of ߠ௜ also is normal with expectation:  
(3)  ܧሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ൬ ଵఙ೔మ ௜ܺԢ ௜ܺ ൅ Σିଵ൰ିଵ ൬ ଵఙ೔మ ௜ܺԢ ௜ܺߠ෠௜ ൅ Σିଵߤ൰ 
where ௜ܺ is the matrix of returns on the four factors plus the intercept, ߠ෠௜ is the OLS parameter 
estimate, and ߪ௜ଶ is the variance of the errors in (2). The corresponding covariance matrix is 
given by: 
(4)  ܸሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ൬ ଵఙ೔మ ௜ܺԢ ௜ܺ ൅ Σିଵ൰ିଵ 
As the prior mean µ and the prior covariance matrix Σ in eq. (3) and (4), we take the 
cross-sectional averages of the time series OLS estimates of the coefficients of (2) and their 
corresponding empirical covariance matrix for all funds in the cross section of our sample in a 
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given 12-month formation period.10 Thus, we have the same priors for all funds in a given 
month. According to eq. (3), the posterior estimate of ߠ௜ is the matrix-weighted average of the 
prior ߤ and the OLS estimate ߠ෠௜; the same holds for the posterior estimate of the covariance 
matrix in eq. (4).11. Confidence in the prior is the reciprocal of the estimation efficiency of the 
OLS estimate for each fund. Thus, the empirical Bayesian adjustment ‘shrinks’ any extreme 
parameters towards the mean of the prior, where the degree of shrinkage depends on the cross-
sectional dispersion of the parameters, given by Σ. The Bayesian adjustment is greater, the lower 
the estimation efficiency of the funds' OLS parameters. The intuition is that it is less likely for a 
fund to generate high alphas if all other funds generate relatively low alphas during the same 
period. However, the posterior distribution of ߠ௜ also takes the multivariate nature of the 
coefficients’ dependency into account: e.g. if small-cap funds tend to have positive alphas (i.e. 
there is a positive correlation between ߙ௜ and ߚଶ௜ in eq. (2)), a potentially negative OLS estimate 
of a small-cap fund i’s alpha receives a positive adjustment by the Bayesian approach. 
This argument is similar to the methodology of Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005) who, in 
addition, take the similarity in investment strategies into account. They attribute a higher skill 
level to fund managers who deliver their outperformance with a similar strategy to other skilled 
fund managers in comparison with managers who used a completely different strategy. The 
latter are classified as lucky rather than skilled. Consequently, alpha-sorting based on Bayesian 
                                                 
 
10
 Specifically, we estimate time-series OLS regressions for each of the N funds in the data set for months 1 to 12. 
We average the N ߠ෠௜ estimates to form µ and use the empirical covariance matrix  of these N ߠ෠௜ estimates to form Σ. 
We plug µ and Σ into eq. (3) and (4) to obtain the mean and variance of the posterior distribution of ߠ௜ for month 
13. We repeat this process using the observations in months 2 to 13 in order to obtain the posterior distribution in 
month 14. We continue until the end of our data set using these rolling windows. 
11
 HV experimented with various methods to obtain the posterior estimates, namely simple linear shrinkage, 
iterative Bayesian, and Gibbs sampling, but found that these other methods for estimating the posterior did not 
improve on their empirical Bayesian approach, and therefore we follow HV in adopting the same approach.  
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four-factor alphas accounts for a risk-adjustment of the performance measure used for the 
ranking, corrects for different investment styles and reduces the influence of high-risk strategies 
on the ranking. We also compare these results with portfolio formation based on raw returns, but 
we believe that, in contrast to the raw return-sorting, the Bayesian alpha-sorting provides a 
much more reliable separation between skilled and unskilled but lucky fund managers.12  
3.2.b.  REGRESSION    
We also perform a pooled regression with the difference in annualized performance between the 
evaluation year and the formation year as the dependent variable. These performance changes 
over time are then regressed on a set of control variables, including net inflows and a manager 
change dummy. This regression offers additional insights into the impact of fund flows and 
manager changes on fund performance over time. Furthermore, it provides us with the 
opportunity not only of separating the effects of fund flows and manager changes, but also of 
measuring their marginal impact and their interaction with other fund characteristics. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE 
Figure 2 reveals that our results on the dynamics of mutual fund returns over time are consistent 
with the earlier conclusions of Carhart (1997) who reported a lack of performance persistence 
and a strong tendency for performance to mean revert. Specifically, the top ten percent of funds 
(winner funds)13 generate raw returns in the formation year of 1.45 percent per month which 
decline to 0.59 percent per month in the subsequent evaluation year. The bottom ten percent of 
                                                 
 
12The average fund flows in the deciles and subgroups are not qualitatively different when we form portfolio deciles 
based on raw returns instead of the Bayesian four-factor alphas. One might conjecture raw returns are more relevant 
because retail investors are unlikely to calculate four-factor alphas. The subgroups should not be affected as we 
explicitly use fund flows as a second sorting mechanism. 
13
 Determined by having the highest 10 percent of Bayesian four-factor alphas. 
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funds (loser funds), in contrast, experience a mean reversion in raw returns from -0.36 to 0.34 
percent per month. In other words, a raw return spread of 1.81 percent per month (21.72 percent 
per annum) in the formation year declines to 0.25 percent per month (3.00 percent per annum) in 
the evaluation year. Having established that performance persistence is mean reverting amongst 
both winner funds and loser funds, we now investigate how fund flows and manager changes 
affect these results. 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here]  
4.2. WINNER FUNDS 
Winner funds, on average, have a formation-period fund size of 794.0 million USD, receive 8.5 
million USD of new net inflows per month and the manager changes in 17 percent of the cases 
(Table 2). They grow to an average size of 1,037.0 million USD in the evaluation period due to 
internal (investment performance) and external growth (fund flows). Conditioning on fund 
flows, we separate winner funds into a subgroup with “low absolute net inflows” during the 
formation period averaging -5.6 million USD per month and a subgroup with “high absolute net 
inflows” averaging 22.6 million USD per month, a significant difference of 28.2 million USD. 
The fraction of managers leaving winner funds is the same for both subgroups at 17 percent, but 
winner funds with low absolute net inflows tend to be smaller (675.0 million USD) than winner 
funds with high absolute net inflows (976.4 million USD).14 Conditioning on manager changes 
yields a subgroup “without manager change” which has slightly higher inflows and a larger 
average fund size compared to the subgroup “with manager change” (Table 2, panel (c)).  
                                                 
 
14
 According to Chen et al. (2004), differences in fund size affect fund performance. However, using relative net 
inflows instead of absolute net inflows yields more uniformly distributed subgroups with respect to fund size, but 
with very similar conclusions with respect to investment performance. Thus, our results do not seem to be affected 
by differences in fund size. This conclusion is also supported by the pooled regression results (Table 9). 
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[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Winner Decile-10 funds, on average, generate alphas of 0.01 percent per month, equivalent to a 
mean reversion from the formation to the evaluation period of -0.81 percentage points per 
month (Table 3, panels (a) and (c), and Figure 3). Winner funds experiencing neither inflows 
nor a manager change outperform the benchmark model (2) by 0.08 percentage points per 
month, though this is not significantly different from zero. This corresponds to a significant 
mean reversion of only -0.69 percentage points per month. Winner funds suffering from both 
high inflows and a manager change generate negative, albeit insignificant, alphas of -0.11 
percent per month, equivalent to a significant mean reversion of -0.96 percentage points per 
month. The evaluation-period spread in alphas of 0.19 percentage points per month between 
winner funds suffering from neither mechanism and those experiencing both is significant, both 
in statistical and economic terms (0.19 = 0.08 (low/ without) – (-0.11) (high/ with), Table 3, 
panel (a)). The difference in raw returns between winner funds suffering from both equilibrating 
mechanisms and those affected by neither one is also striking: raw returns of the former revert to 
equilibrium at -1.16 percentage points per month compared with -0.62 percentage points per 
month for the latter (Table 4, panel (c)). We conclude from this that fund flows and manager 
changes acting together strongly contribute to mean reversion in winner-fund performance. 
[Please insert Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 3 about here] 
As we have seen in Table 2, panel (b), the occurrence of a manager change seems to be 
independent of fund flows, since, on average, 17 percent of managers change each year in both 
subgroups with high and low net inflows. The difference in fund flows between winner funds 
without and those with a manager change is statistically significant but economically small at 
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3.6 million USD. We conclude that the incidence of one mechanism does not affect the 
likelihood of the other mechanism occurring.  
Even though the occurrence of either mechanism appears to be independent, controlling 
for one mechanism could still alter the impact of the other mechanism on future investment 
performance. In fact, this is what we find. Among winner funds, there is evidence that the two 
mechanisms interact as complements. If there is a manager change, fund inflows have a 
significantly negative impact on performance of 0.22 percentage points per month, whereas if 
there is no manager change, the differential effect of low and high fund inflows is only 0.13 
percentage points per month (Table 3, panel (a)). When controlling for fund flows and 
investigating the effects of a manager change, the spread in alphas is an insignificant -0.03 
percentage points per month for the low-inflow subgroup, but a positive, though insignificant 
0.06 percentage points per month for the high-inflow subgroup, in contrast with the case of a 
manager change (Table 3, panel (a)). Comparing the single sorting results, fund flows have a 
powerful effect on performance with the spread in alphas between the low inflows and high 
inflows groups being a significant 0.15 percentage points per month. In contrast, a single sort on 
the change in manager has little effect on the performance of these winner funds with only a 
0.01 percentage points per month spread. We conclude that fund flows by themselves and also 
in conjunction with manager changes significantly affect winner-fund performance and are 
complementary to each other. High net inflows are more harmful for subsequent performance 
than a manager change, possibly as a result of the transaction costs triggered by a liquidity-
induced increase in trading. 
Finally for winner funds, we examine portfolio risk changes between the formation and 
valuation periods. Table 5 presents the standard deviations of monthly returns for each winner 
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fund sub-group and the spread portfolios. In addition, the fractions of the standard deviation 
explained by systemic risk according to the four-factor model (2), are reported in square 
brackets underneath each standard deviation. Table 5, panel (c) shows that winner funds 
significantly increase risk between the two periods by 0.33 percentage points per month 
irrespective of whether there is a manager change or whether inflows are high or low. However, 
the increase in risk is much larger (0.43 percentage points per month) if there is no manager 
change and if the fund is experiencing high inflows. The increase in risk is much weaker (0.07 
percentage points per month), and not statistically significant, in the case of a manager change 
and low inflows. These findings are consistent with the presence of an overconfidence bias in 
investment decision making by successful fund managers. Comparing the changes in these 
systematic and idiosyncratic values between the formation and evaluation periods for each 
portfolio, it can be seen that there are only very minor changes between the formation and 
evaluation periods, so the changes in risk must be explained by both systematic and 
idiosyncratic components (Table 5, panels (a) and (b)). 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3. LOSER FUNDS 
Loser funds, on average, are smaller compared with winner funds with total net assets of 700.4 
million USD in the formation period (Table 6). Fund size remains relatively stable over time and 
decreases only slightly to 681.0 million USD in the evaluation period. This is explained by net 
inflows being negative, as expected, although small in magnitude at only -2.3 million USD per 
month, on average. It is clear that many investors are reluctant to withdraw money from poorly 
performing funds. We sort the loser-decile-1 funds into two subgroups on the basis of net 
inflows, one experiencing the lowest net inflows (i.e., the largest outflows) averaging -12.4 
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million USD and the other with high net inflows averaging 7.8 million USD. The difference in 
average fund flows between the low- and high-fund-flow subgroups of loser funds is only about 
two-thirds as large as the same difference for winner funds (20.2 million USD versus 28.2 
million USD). Loser funds with high net inflows and a manager change are the smallest 
subgroup in the formation period with a size of 374.1 million USD, while loser funds 
experiencing both governance mechanisms simultaneously are the largest at 688.6 million USD 
(Table 6, panel (c)).  
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Tables 7 and 8 report the interaction of the two governance mechanisms and fund performance 
(see also Figure 4). Loser-fund performance, on average, reverts from alphas of -0.89 percent 
per month in the formation period to a still significantly negative -0.21 percent per month in the 
evaluation period, a statistically significant performance improvement of 0.68 percentage points 
per month (Table 7, and Figure 4). However, distinct differences emerge in evaluation-period 
performance when conditioning on both governance mechanisms. Loser funds that benefit from 
both mechanisms have insignificant alphas of -0.09 percent per month in the evaluation period 
compared with significant alphas of -0.90 percent per month in the formation period which 
corresponds to a striking degree of mean reversion of 0.81 percentage points per month. Funds 
without either form of governance mechanism continue to significantly underperform by -0.25 
percentage points per month, regressing to the mean by only 0.63 percentage points per month. 
The spread in alphas between loser funds experiencing both governance mechanisms and those 
not benefiting from either is a highly significant 0.16 percentage points per month (0.16 = -0.09 
(low/ with) – (-0.25) (high/without), Table 7, panel (a)). Differences in mean reversion based on 
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raw returns are even more pronounced: the raw returns of loser funds with a manager 
replacement and low net inflows improve by a (weakly) significant 0.84 percentage points per 
month; while the raw returns of loser funds without a manager change and high net inflows 
improve by an insignificant 0.56 percentage points per month (Table 8, panel (c)). Thus, if 
operating simultaneously, the internal and external governance mechanisms strongly contribute 
to an improvement in loser-fund performance.  
[Please insert Tables 7 and 8 and Figure 4 about here] 
How do both mechanisms contribute to this effect? A comparison of the characteristics 
of the subgroups reveals that the internal and external governance mechanisms interact 
positively: funds with low net inflows have a higher fraction of manager changes (22 percent) 
than funds with high net inflows (16 percent) and funds with a manager change have lower net 
inflows (-4.5 million USD per month) than funds without (-1.8 million USD per month) 
(Table 6, panels (a) and (b)). Moreover, internal and external governance among loser funds are 
also complements in terms of their performance impact. The alpha spread between loser funds 
with low net inflows and those with high net inflows is significantly positive at 0.19 percentage 
points per month only when internal governance is operating at the same time. If there is no 
internal governance, this spread is a weakly significant 0.08 percentage points per month 
(Table 7, panel (a)). Conversely, the spread between loser funds with a manager replacement 
and those without is positive but insignificant at 0.08 percentage points per month if money is 
flowing out of the fund at the same time, while it is negative and also insignificant at -0.03 
percentage points per month if outflows do not occur. Also internal governance seems to be 
more effective if external governance is simultaneously operating.  
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The results for raw returns are similar though slightly smaller in magnitude, especially in 
the case where both mechanisms are not operating simultaneously. In fact, outflows appear to 
improve loser-fund raw returns by significant 0.21 percentage points per month in combination 
with a manager replacement, although the low-minus-high raw-return spread is still a positive 
but insignificant 0.08 percentage points per month in the case of no manager change (Table 8, 
panel (a)). Compared with the similar sized alpha spread of the same subgroup, this implies that 
fund managers who stay with the fund do not seem to use the outflows to re-optimize their 
portfolio by bringing in new investment ideas, but merely scale down existing investments in a 
way that reduces unfavorable factor loadings in the benchmark model. Specifically, loser funds 
without outflows have significantly negative momentum loadings, while those experiencing 
outflows reduce these loadings to levels close to zero (not reported in the tables).  
We conclude from this that loser funds suffer from two types of disposition effect: one 
due to investor behavior and one due to the actions of the fund management company. It appears 
that a large fraction of loser-fund investors are reluctant to withdraw their money. This behavior 
is consistent with a disposition effect whereby investors are hesitant to realize losses and so stay 
invested in the hope that the fund price eventually returns to the original purchase price. 
However, our results show that staying invested in loser funds is a sub-optimal strategy, because 
performance remains negative. In contrast, investors could earn 0.08 percent per month 
abnormal returns by switching to previous-year winner funds with lower inflows and no 
manager change (Table 3, panel (a)). The second disposition effect relates to the reluctance of 
the fund management company to fire the underperforming manager. Even when outflows 
occur, as in case of the low-inflow subgroups, the performance of existing fund managers does 
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not respond positively to the smaller asset base. It is only when outflows are combined with a 
manager change that performance improves. 
Finally for loser funds, we examine risk changes between the formation and evaluation 
periods. Table 9, panel (b) shows that managers with low net inflows (i.e., high outflows) who 
are subsequently fired take on significantly (at 10 percent level) higher risk (5.49 percent per 
month) in the formation period than managers with low net inflows who are not fired (5.43 
percent per month). Panel (c) shows that loser funds reduce risk between the two periods 
irrespective of whether there is a manager change or whether inflows are high or low. The 
reduction in risk is the same whether there is a change in manager or not (-0.18 percentage 
points per month). These results provide support for the predictions by Dangl et al. (2008).15 As 
with the winner funds, there are only slight changes in the systematic and idiosyncratic risks 
between the formation and evaluation period for each portfolio. 
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
4.4. WINNER-LOSER SPREADS 
We now extend our analysis and explore the effect of the two equilibrating mechanisms on the 
subsequent spread in winner and loser portfolio returns. The spread in alphas between winner 
and loser funds for the 12-month portfolio formation period is 1.71 percentage points per month, 
obtained as the difference between the unconditional alphas in panel (b) of Table 3 (0.82 percent 
per month) and panel (b) of Table 7 (-0.89 percent per month). The spread in alphas between the 
winner and the loser portfolio is 0.22 percentage points per month for the 12-month evaluation 
period, obtained as the difference between the unconditional alphas in panel (a) of Table 3 (0.01 
                                                 
 
15
 A comparison between Table 9 and Table 5 reveals that risk taking is generally higher in winner funds than loser 
funds during both the formation and evaluation periods.  
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percent per month) and panel (a) of Table 7 (-0.21 percent per month). This spread is similar to 
the winner-minus-loser spread in the Carhart (1997) study, although his spread is statistically 
significant.  
A key issue now is how this spread is affected by the equilibrating mechanisms. 
Specifically, we compare the performance of the winner and loser portfolios in six different 
scenarios, which are defined in panel (a) of Table 10. Panel (b) reports the corresponding alphas 
(see also Figure 5). In the first column of panel (b), we report the alphas of funds that experience 
neither equilibrating mechanism. Our hypotheses suggest that we would expect to find the 
highest level of positive and negative performance persistence among these funds. The next two 
columns report the performance results when either manager changes or fund flows are not 
operating. The fourth column reports the unconditional winner-minus-loser spread, not taking 
fund flows or manager changes into account. The next two columns report the results for funds 
that experience one of the mechanisms. In the last column, the results where both mechanisms 
operate simultaneously are reported. In this last case, we would expect to find the strongest 
tendency of fund performance to revert to the mean. 
[Please insert Table 10 and Figure 5 about here] 
We find that winner and loser funds that experience neither mechanism yield a highly 
significant winner-minus-loser spread of 0.34 percentage points per month (Table 10, panel (b) 
and Figure 5). This spread falls when conditioning on funds not experiencing a manager change 
(but without conditioning on fund flows). For the unconditional winner-minus-loser spread 
portfolio, alphas turn out to be an insignificant 0.22 percentage points per month as noted above. 
This spread decreases further when concentrating only on funds that experience either the 
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manager-change mechanism or the fund-flow mechanism to an insignificant 0.20 and 0.09 
percentage points per month, respectively. For winner and loser funds that experience both 
equilibrating mechanisms simultaneously, we find an insignificant spread between winner and 
loser funds of -0.02 percentage points per month. Thus, when investors and managers take 
advantage of outperformance or react to underperformance in the formation period, the 
equilibrium processes force the spread between previous winner and loser funds to become 
virtually zero (-0.02 percentage points per month) in the evaluation period. In contrast, if funds 
are not exposed to these mechanisms, the spread is a significant 0.34 percentage points per 
month. The equilibrating mechanisms seem to be able to explain the reduction in the winner-
minus-loser spread by 0.36 percentage points per month. This highlights the importance of fund 
flows and manager changes in explaining mean reversion in mutual fund performance and why 
mutual fund performance is unlikely to persist in well-functioning markets. 
4.5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS16 
In this section, we report the results of a number of tests on the robustness of the above findings. 
First, we report rankings based on returns adjusted for peer-group benchmarks, since these are 
widely used by practitioners for evaluation purposes. We classified funds in our sample into 13 
styles: large-cap, mid-cap, small-cap, growth, growth & income, income, sector funds (financial, 
health, natural resources, technology, utilities, other), and other. We defined peer-group-
adjusted returns as the difference between the fund’s returns and the average returns of all peer-
group funds with the same fund style. The results from evaluating performance from a ranking 
based on these peer-adjusted benchmark returns are presented in Table 11. Compared with the 
results for raw returns, the rankings by benchmark-adjusted returns do not change greatly. The 
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 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting these tests. 
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one exception is for the returns of winner funds with manager change but low net inflows which 
are significantly lower: the corresponding "low minus high" spread is no longer significant for 
this subgroup, although it remains significant when not conditioning on manager change.  
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
 Second, to control for the fact that estimation errors are potentially not independently 
distributed in the cross section of funds, we estimated the model recently suggested by Hunter, 
Kandel, Kandel and Wermers (2014) which adds an active peer benchmark (APB) to the four-
factor model. Adding an APB factor can help to account for dynamically changing 
“commonalities” across fund returns (as a result of the funds following similar investment 
strategies) and improve the estimation of the prior covariance matrix (see also Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2002). Hunter et al. (2014) show that the APB factor can explain a significant 
proportion of the cross correlation between the residuals in the four-factor model for the 
different funds. In particular, they show that the within-group (individual fund pair) residual 
correlations are decreased by one-third to one-half of their prior levels, depending on the peer 
group. This indicates that the APB factor successfully captures common idiosyncratic risk-
taking within peer groups. The APB factor for each peer-group is estimated as the residual series 
from a regression of an equal-weighted portfolio of all funds with the same investment style on 
the standard four factors in eq. (2). We use the same 13 investment styles as for the peer-group-
adjusted returns listed above.  
[Please insert Table 12 about here] 
Table 12 reports the performance evaluation results from ranking funds on the basis of 
this APB adjustment, and these results can be compared with the performance results from the 
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standard benchmark model in Tables 3 and 7. The results are robust to the addition of the APB 
factor for ranking on past performance. For winner funds, the alphas in panel (a) of Table 12 are 
in general similar to those in panel (a) of Table 3. There is again one exception: winner funds 
with low inflows and manager change now significantly outperform the benchmark model (2) 
by 0.23 percentage points per month (without the APB adjustment, the outperformance was an 
insignificant 0.11 percentage points per month). The results for loser funds are quantitatively 
very similar, comparing panel (b) of Table 12 with panel (a) of Table 7. 
Finally, in an unreported robustness test, we addressed the concern that in our empirical 
Bayesian approach the prior and conditioning information are potentially not independent 
because the prior is the cross-sectional mean (ߠ௜ሻ of all the funds in the sample which includes 
the fund i under consideration. We therefore re-estimated the model using the cross-sectional 
median rather than the mean as the prior to reduce the effect of any outliers. However, this does 
not significantly affect our results; monthly alphas only change by 1-2 basis points and, in a 
very few cases, by 3 basis points. 
4.6. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In this section, we perform a pooled regression of the change in annualized Bayesian four-factor 
alphas between the formation and evaluation periods (each 12 months long) on relative net 
inflows, manager changes and a set of other control variables documented in the literature as 
having an influence on performance. Over this time-frame, fund flows and manager changes 
will be simultaneously determined with the change in performance, and we allow for potential 
endogeneity by estimating a system of equations using three-stage least squares (3SLS). In the 
first stage, the endogenous regressors (change in performance, fund flows, and manager change) 
are regressed against predetermined and exogenous control variables (all the other variables in 
29 
 
the system), and their predicted values are used as instruments in the second stage regressions. 
The third stage estimates the model using generalized least squares (GLS) to allow for the 
correlation structure in the disturbances across the three structural equations in the system. We 
focus on relative flows to ensure comparability across funds. The aims of the regression analysis 
are threefold: first, by controlling for other performance determinants, we are able to measure 
the marginal impact of fund flows and manager changes, as well as the interaction with other 
control variables, and hence identify the factors that explain why the equilibrating mechanisms 
work for some funds but not others; second, it allows us to analyze the performance impact of 
both equilibrating mechanisms over time; and third, it serves as a further robustness check on 
the ranked portfolio results. 
In our first model, we include the following predetermined control variables: fund size 
(measured by total net assets, TNA), fund fees, fund age and the portfolio turnover ratio.17,18 In 
addition, following the models of fund flows by Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Del Guercio and 
Tkac (2002) potential instruments used for fund flows are lagged fund performance and the 
predetermined control variables; and following Khorana (1996) the same instruments are used in 
the manager change equation.19 The Hansen J-test identified lagged flows and lagged portfolio 
turnover as valid instruments for fund flows, and with these instruments the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test for regressor endogeneity confirmed that fund flows are indeed endogenous. We 
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 Chen et al. (2004) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find a negative effect of fund size on performance; Carhart 
(1997) documents a negative effect from fees; Huij and Verbeek (2007) and Karoui and Meier (2009) report an 
outperformance by young funds. Results on turnover are ambiguous. Elton et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997) find a 
negative relationship, Wermers (2000) documents that turnover is unrelated to fund performance, while Dahlquist, 
Engstroem, and Soederlind (2000) and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find a positive relationship. 
18
 The portfolio turnover ratio is defined as the minimum of aggregated sales and aggregated purchases of 
securities, divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. It measures the fraction of the portfolio 
traded over the previous 12 months. 
19
 Because the same instruments are used in both the fund flows and manager change first-stage reduced-form 
regressions, it was not possible to identify both of these equations, and we subsequently only allow for the 
endogeneity of fund flows. 
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also test for weak instruments, and can confirm that the null of weak instruments is rejected 
using the Stock-Yogo criteria. The results with these instruments estimated using 3SLS are 
presented in Table 13. Because there is a strong tendency for the extremes in fund performance 
to revert to the mean, we add to our regression two dummy variables that indicate whether a 
fund is currently in decile 10 (winner) or decile 1 (loser), based on previous-year performance. 
These dummies capture the pure mean reversion effect and ensure that the other coefficients are 
not biased. The key variables of interest are net inflows and the manager change dummy.20 We 
also include an interaction term between fund flows and the decile-10 and decile-1-dummies in 
order to analyze the differential effects of fund flows on performance in the top and bottom 
funds. Similarly, we use a manager-change dummy indicating whether the fund manager has 
been replaced during the previous year and an interaction term between manager change and the 
decile-10 and decile-1 dummies.  
In a second model, we analyze the impact of being a small-cap or a sector fund on 
performance and the marginal impact of fund flows on winner and loser funds that belong to 
these two investment-style categories. We anticipate that capacity constraints are more prevalent 
in narrow and illiquid markets where transactions costs are higher and, as a result, fund flows 
have a stronger impact on performance in these investment categories. A third model 
investigates the interaction effect between a manager change and the fund being a member of a 
large fund family. Gervais, Lynch, and Musto (2005) argue that the replacement of an 
underperforming manager in a large fund family reveals more information than the replacement 
of a manager in a small fund family. We assign a fund to the large-family group if its fund 
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 We winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to avoid any influence from extreme outliers. 
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family was in the top 30 percent of fund families by number of funds offered at the end of the 
previous year. 
A fourth model assesses the interaction between the manager-change and fund-flow 
mechanisms. Specifically, we include a dummy for winner funds that have higher-than-median 
net inflows and a manager change and a dummy for loser funds that have lower-than-median net 
inflows (i.e., net outflows) and a manager change.  
Since we measure the change in performance between consecutive 12 month periods, a 
significant coefficient on one of the control variables would indicate a trend in performance over 
time. Table 13 indicates that, across all models, each billion USD increase in TNA reduces 
alpha by 0.09 percentage points per annum. The decile-1 and decile-10-dummies are both highly 
significant and indicate that loser funds improve their annualized alphas by 6.91 to 6.92 
percentage points per annum in the following year, irrespective of the specific model, while the 
alphas of winner funds deteriorate by 7.10 to 7.14 percentage points per annum in the following 
year, before conditioning on any other variable. These findings, indicating strong mean 
reversion, are consistent with the results of the ranked portfolio tests.  
[Please insert Table 13 about here] 
We document a significant negative relationship between relative net inflows and 
subsequent performance. An increase in relative net inflows by one standard deviation during 
the previous year decreases the alpha for the average fund by 0.65 (= -0.49 x 1.33) percentage 
points per annum on average in the following year.21 Model 1 reveals that performance 
decreases by an additional 0.63 (= -0.47 x 1.33) percentage points per annum for winner funds, 
                                                 
 
21
 1.33 is the standard deviation of relative fund flows, not reported in the tables. 
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although this decrease is not statistically significant. Controlling for a fund’s market segment 
shows that performance decreases by a significant additional 1.52 (= -1.14 x 1.33) percentage 
points per annum if the winner fund is a small-cap or sector fund and receives high inflows 
(Models 2-4). This supports the notion that capacity constraints are partly driven by transaction 
costs.  
A manager change has a significant positive impact on the average fund, but if the 
manager of a winner-decile-10 fund changes, performance subsequently significantly 
deteriorates by between 1.10 and 1.14 percentage points per annum in the following year, 
according to Models 1-3. The more general Model 4 shows that this effect operates through fund 
flows: winner funds that lose their manager, while also experiencing above-median net inflows, 
experience an average deterioration in performance of 2.17 percentage points per annum in the 
following year. Thus, the pooled regression results confirm the complementary of the interaction 
between the mechanisms among winner funds identified in the ranked portfolio tests. If the star 
manager of a large fund family leaves, the effect is not significantly different from the case in 
which the manager of a small fund family departs, implying that not even large fund families 
have access to the fund management skills that would prevent the deterioration in performance 
following the loss of a talented manager. 
For loser funds, there is an improvement in alpha of 1.40 (= (0.49 + 0.56) x 1.33) 
percentage points per annum following a one standard deviation increase in relative outflows, 
although this effect is not significantly different from the general performance improvement of 
0.65 percentage points per annum for the average fund (Model 1). Further, being a small-cap or 
sector fund has little effect on the relationship between outflows and subsequent performance 
(Model 2). The improvement in performance following a manager change, although positive, is 
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insignificant for a typical loser fund, according to Models 1 and 2. However, the more 
sophisticated Models 3 and 4 reveal that replacing an underperforming manager in a fund 
belonging to a large fund family improves performance significantly by an additional 1.84 to 
1.90 percentage points per annum in the following year. This finding supports the predictions of 
Gervais, Lynch, and Musto (2005) that a manager replacement in a large family contains more 
information, particularly if it is associated with an underperforming manager. Model 4 
additionally shows a strong interaction between the two mechanisms: if loser funds fire their 
manager, while also experiencing above-median outflows, this results in an aggregate 
performance improvement of 2.86 percentage points per annum in the following year – although 
this is attenuated by a deterioration of 1.72 percentage points per annum as a result of the pure 
effect of a manager change in a bottom performing fund. These results support the findings from 
the ranked portfolio tests that manager changes and fund flows work together to prevent 
performance persistence. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have examined the role of fund flows and manager changes as equilibrating mechanisms 
that explain the elimination of persistence in mutual fund performance over time. Using a CRSP 
sample of 6,207 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1992 to 2011, 
we find that a significant part of the mean reversion in winner funds and loser funds can be 
explained by the two mechanisms operating together, i.e., by the responses of investors, fund 
managers and fund management companies to past performance.  
In the case of winner funds, these effects are much more important in explaining below-
average performance than, say, the impact of fees. We provide empirical support for the Berk 
and Green (2004) hypothesis that inflows of new money have a significant effect in inducing 
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mean reversion and are more important than manager changes. Both mechanisms together cause 
a reduction in risk-adjusted performance of 0.19 percentage points per month (2.28 percentage 
points per annum), and they appear to operate in a complementary manner to each other. For 
loser funds, fund flows (which we associate with external governance) and manager changes 
(which we associate with internal governance) also complement each other. There is little 
significant impact on risk-adjusted returns when one of the mechanisms is operating alone. But 
when both governance mechanisms operate simultaneously, the risk-adjusted performance of 
loser funds improves by 0.16 percentage points per month (1.92 percentage points per annum) 
compared with the subgroup of loser funds that are not subject to either mechanism.  
We also analyzed the spread between the subsequent performance of winner and loser 
funds, as a measure of performance persistence, with and without changes in fund flows and 
fund management. The comparison of the winner-minus-loser spread reveals that both 
mechanisms strongly contribute to performance persistence and to mean reversion. The 
unconditional winner-minus-loser spread is 0.22 percentage points per month (2.64 percentage 
points per annum) but insignificant. However, when we separate out the effects, we find that 
conditioning only on those winner and loser funds that are not exposed to both equilibrating 
mechanisms, the winner-minus-loser spread increases to a highly significant 0.34 percentage 
points per month (4.08 percentage points per annum), indicating strong performance persistence. 
When these winner and loser funds experience both types of mechanisms simultaneously, the 
corresponding spread is dramatically reduced to an insignificant -0.02 percentage points per 
month (-0.24 percentage points per annum). 
In respect of changes in risk taking, we find that winning fund managers increase risk in 
a way that suggests that they are subject to an overconfidence bias. In the case of losing fund 
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managers, our results confirm the predictions of Dangl et al. (2008). Loser funds reduce their 
risk levels irrespective of whether there has been a change of either manager or the level of fund 
inflows. But, losing fund managers who are subsequently fired take on significantly higher risk 
in the formation period than managers who are not fired. However, risk taking is generally 
higher in winner funds than loser funds during both the formation and evaluation periods. 
What are the potential implications of these findings? First of all, investors should pay 
close attention to fund flows and the resulting changes in fund size as well as to the career paths 
of individual fund managers across different funds: our results suggest that superior past 
performance is only a reliable indicator of future performance for those cases where the 
manager remains in post and fund flows are not excessively responsive to past performance. An 
example of a potentially successful strategy would therefore be to invest in previous-year 
winner funds with low inflows and no manager change. Following directly from the previous 
point, it would be very valuable for investors if fund management companies were required to 
publish regular information on fund flows and report any manager changes immediately.  
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Appendix: Data Selection 
In constructing our sample, we follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only domestic 
equity funds. We exclude international funds, global funds, balanced funds, flexible funds, and 
funds of funds. We further drop all funds containing terms in their name that commonly refer to 
passive vehicles. We require our funds to have at least 12 months of return data available to be 
included in our sample. Additionally, we drop all observations prior to the IPO date given by 
CRSP and funds without names in order to account for a potential incubation bias (Evans, 
2010). This results in 6,207 funds that existed at some time during our sample period from 1992 
to 2011. Different share classes of the same fund have the same manager and fund flows of 
individual share classes cancel out at the portfolio level. Hence, we combine all share classes 
that belong to the same fund and have the same underlying portfolio to one observation. We use 
a matching algorithm that combines information from the fund's name and the portfolio number 
variable given by CRSP.22 Fund characteristics, such as the investment objective or the first 
offer date, are taken from the oldest share class. Quantitative information is either summed up, 
such as total net assets, or the weighted average over all share classes are taken, such as returns 
and fees. If two share classes of the same funds have different manager change dates, we use the 
most recent date. We classify the funds in our sample into three groups: (1) large and mid-cap 
funds (LMC), (2) small-cap funds (SC), and (3) sector funds (SEC). Because ICDI classification 
codes are no longer available in the 2011 cut off of the CRSP mutual fund database, we modify 
the selection criteria of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) as follows. For our classification, we use 
Lipper codes, Wiesenberger codes and Strategic Insight codes (priority is given in that order if 
different codes are not consistent). Details are given in Table 14. A fund is assigned to one of 
                                                 
 
22
 A matching solely based on the portfolio number variable is not possible, as this variable is available only from 
December 1998 onwards. 
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the three groups for the total sample period if it belonged to this group for at least 50 percent of 
the observations in our sample period. We also classified our sample of domestic equity funds 
into the following 13 style groups: cap-based funds large-cap; cap-based funds mid-cap; cap-
based funds small-cap; style funds growth; style funds growth and income; style funds income; 
sector funds financial; sector funds health; sector funds natural resources; sector funds 
technology; sector funds utilities; sector funds other; and other. 
[Please insert Table 14 about here] 
 
 
Figure 1: Portfolio formation
This figure presents the methodology we apply to construct the subgroup portfolios. Funds are first sorted into deciles based on their performance in the formation
period. Then, the winner (decile 10) and loser (decile 1) funds are further divided into: (a) a low-net-inflow (high-net-inflow) subgroup if the net inflows in the formation
period are lower (higher) than the median net inflows of the decile to which the funds belong (we use either absolute net inflows or relative net inflows, but, in the
presentation of our results, we concentrate on absolute flows, see also footnote 7); (b) a without (with) manager-change subgroup if the manager remained the same
(changed) during the formation period; and (c) into four subgroups combining the criteria in (a) and (b) in a double sorting mechanism.
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Figure 2: Mean reversion of fund performance
This figure presents the average monthly raw returns in percent of the decile portfolios relative to the evaluation
year (t). Portfolios are formed based on previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas.
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Figure 3: Performance of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This figure presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent for winner funds and winner-fund subgroups based
on a single sorting and also a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager change. The top panel
presents the level of performance (four-factor alpha) in the evaluation period and the bottom panel presents
the change in performance between the formation and evaluation periods (∆ alpha). Funds are assigned to the
high-net-inflow (high) or low-net-inflow (low) subgroup based on whether their net inflows during the formation
period are higher or lower than the median net inflows of all other funds in the same decile. Funds are assigned
to the manager-change (with) or no-manager-change (without) subgroup based on whether their fund manager
changed during the formation period. Portfolios are formed based on previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
(a) Uncond. (b) Single sorting (c) Double sorting
Flows Manager change Flows & manager change
winner low high w/o with low
w/o
low
with
high
w/o
high
with
0.11
0.15
0.09
0.08
0.10
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.05
o
r a
lp
h
a
 (%
)
,
0.00
ly
 fo
u
r‐f
a
ct
o
‐0.06
‐0.05
‐0.05
m
o
n
th
l
‐0.11
‐0.10
‐0.15
winner low high withoutwith low low high high‐0.40
‐0.50
a
 (%
)
‐0.60
‐fa
ct
o
r a
lp
h
a
‐0.69***
‐0.69***
‐0.66***‐0 .70
o
n
th
ly
 fo
u
r‐
‐0.81***
‐0.79*** ‐0.80***
‐0.80
ch
a
n
g
e
 in
 m
‐0.92*** ‐0.91***
‐0.90
c
‐0.96***
‐1.00
winner low high withoutwith low low high high
46
Figure 4: Performance of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This figure presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent for loser funds and loser-fund subgroups based on a
single sorting and also a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager change. See the note to figure 3
for more explanation.
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Figure 5: Performance of winner-minus-loser spread portfolios
This figure presents monthly four-factor alphas in percentage points in the evaluation period for the winner-
minus-loser spread portfolio based on a single sorting and also a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or
manager change. See the note to figure 3 for more explanation.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the funds in the sample
This table presents the characteristics of the sample of funds for subperiods and for the whole period from 1992
to 2011. We restrict our sample to funds that have at least 12 months of available return data and information
on the variable “mgr date” in the CRSP database (see Appendix). Row (1) reports the number of months in
the respective period; row (2) reports monthly (arithmetic) average raw returns in excess of the rate on the
risk-free asset in percent; row (3) reports the average portfolio turnover in percent; row (4) reports average fees
in percent; row (5) reports the average age of the funds in years; row (6) reports the average fund size in million
USD; row (7) reports monthly average absolute net inflows in million USD; row (8) reports the number of funds
in existence; and row (9) reports the number of manager changes that occurred during this period.
subperiods whole period
1992–2000 2001–2003 2004–2007 2008–2011
# months 108 36 48 48 240
raw returns 0.82 -0.29 0.52 0.12 0.36
turnover 105.17 136.15 95.64 92.42 104.42
annual fees 1.45 1.51 1.39 1.36 1.42
fund age 9.74 9.39 11.03 11.97 10.65
fund size 753.68 754.38 1095.53 899.34 875.48
net inflows 5.13 1.35 0.88 1.94 2.57
# funds 3,194 3,374 3,870 4,850 6,207
# man. ch. 3,173 1,517 1,799 1,430 7,919
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Table 2: Characteristics of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This table presents the characteristics for the winner-fund subgroups and the resulting spread portfolios based
on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation
on the portfolio formation. Panel (a) reports average absolute net inflows in the formation period in million
USD; panel (b) reports the fraction of funds experiencing a manager change during the formation period; panel
(c) reports the average fund size in the evaluation period in million USD; panel (d) reports the average fund size
in the formation period in million USD. The first two rows and columns report values conditional on net inflows
and manager change, respectively. Row (3) and column (3) report spreads between the subgroups conditional
on net inflows and manager changes, respectively. Row (4) and column (4) report unconditional values, i. e. not
conditioned on net inflows or manager changes, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− with
(a) Net inflows in formation period (flowst−1, in million USD)
Low −5.0 −8.4 3.4∗∗∗ −5.6
High 23.4 18.6 4.9∗∗∗ 22.6
Low − High −28.4∗∗∗ −27.0∗∗∗ −23.6∗∗∗ −28.2∗∗∗
All 9.5 5.4 3.6∗∗∗ 8.5
(b) Manager changes in formation period (mgr cht−1, in percentage points)
Low 0 100 − 17
High 0 100 − 17
Low − High − − − −
All 0 100 − 17
(c) Fund size in evaluation period (TNAt, in million USD)
Low 657.6 1, 016.1 −358.5∗∗∗ 715.8
High 1, 542.1 936.2 605.9∗∗∗ 1, 438.6
Low − High −884.6∗∗∗ 79.9 −278.7∗∗∗ −722.9
All 1, 050.2 966.8 83.3∗ 1, 037.0
(d) Fund size in formation period (TNAt−1, in million USD)
Low 622.7 947.0 −324.3∗∗∗ 675.0
High 1, 055.8 590.0 465.9∗∗∗ 976.4
Low − High −433.1∗∗∗ 357.1∗∗∗ 32.6 −301.4∗∗∗
All 801.0 756.9 44.2 794.0
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Table 3: Performance of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent for winner funds and the winner-fund subgroups as
well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows
and manager change. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation and the note to
Table 2 for more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports average four-factor alphas in the
evaluation period; panel (b) reports average four-factor alphas in the formation period; panel (c) reports the
change in four-factor alphas between the formation and evaluation periods. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for
the regression coefficients.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− with
(a) Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Low 0.08 0.11 −0.03 0.09
High −0.05 −0.11 0.06 −0.06
Low − High 0.13∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
All 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
(b) Four-factor alphas in formation period (αt−1)
Low 0.77∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.00 0.77∗∗∗
High 0.86∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.00 0.86∗∗∗
Low − High −0.09 −0.09 −0.08 −0.09
All 0.82∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.00 0.82∗∗∗
(c) Change in four-factor alphas (∆αt = αt − αt−1)
Low −0.69∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗ − −0.69∗∗∗
High −0.91∗∗∗ −0.96∗∗∗ − −0.92∗∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All −0.79∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗ − −0.81∗∗∗
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Table 4: Raw returns of winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly raw returns in percent for winner funds and the winner-fund subgroups as well as
the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and
manager change. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation and the note to
Table 2 for more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports average raw returns in the
evaluation period; panel (b) reports average raw returns in the formation period; panel (c) reports the change
in raw returns between the formation and evaluation periods. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− with
(a) Raw returns in evaluation period (rt)
Low 0.65 0.72 −0.07 0.66
High 0.54 0.50 0.03 0.53
Low − High 0.11∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.15 0.13∗∗
All 0.60 0.62 −0.01 0.59
(b) Raw returns in formation period (rt−1)
Low 1.27 1.23 0.04 1.26
High 1.63 1.66 −0.03 1.63
Low − High −0.35 −0.43 −0.39 −0.37
All 1.46 1.43 0.03 1.45
(c) Change in raw returns (∆rt = rt − rt−1)
Low −0.62 −0.51 − −0.60
High −1.09∗∗ −1.16∗∗ − −1.10∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All −0.86∗ −0.81 − −0.85∗
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Table 5: Standard deviations of winner-fund returns and winner-fund subgroup returns
This table presents the standard deviations of monthly returns in percent for winner funds and the winner-fund
subgroups as well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute
fund flows and manager change. Numbers in squared brackets ([.]) in panels (a) and (b) show the fraction of the
standard deviation explained by systematic risk according to the four-factor model, the remainder is explained
by idiosyncratic risk. See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation and the note to
Table 2 for more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports the standard deviations in the
evaluation period; panel (b) the standard deviations in the formation period; panel (c) reports change in the
standard deviations between the formation and evaluation periods. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− with
(a) Standard deviations in evaluation period (Stdt)
Low 5.63 6.04 −0.42 5.70
[0.86] [0.85] [0.01] [0.86]
High 5.70 5.99 −0.29 5.75
[0.86] [0.86] [0.01] [0.86]
Low − High −0.07 0.06 −0.36 −0.05
[−0.00] [−0.01] [0.00] [−0.01]
All 5.68 6.00 −0.32∗∗∗ 5.73
[0.86] [0.86] [0.01] [0.86]
(b) Standard deviations in formation period (Stdt−1)
Low 5.31 5.97 −0.66∗∗∗ 5.42
[0.86] [0.84] [0.02] [0.85]
High 5.26 5.63 −0.36∗∗∗ 5.33
[0.85] [0.83] [0.02] [0.85]
Low − High 0.05 0.35∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
[0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00]
All 5.32 5.78 −0.46∗∗∗ 5.40
[0.85] [0.84] [0.02] [0.85]
(c) Change in standard deviations (∆Stdt = Stdt − Stdt−1)
Low 0.32∗∗∗ 0.07 − 0.28∗∗∗
High 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ − 0.42∗∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All 0.36∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ − 0.33∗∗∗
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Table 6: Characteristics of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents the characteristics for the loser-fund subgroups and the resulting spread portfolios based on
independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. See the note to Table 2 for more explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− without
(a) Net inflows in formation period (flowst−1, in million USD)
Low −13.2 −12.2 −1.0 −12.4
High 6.9 7.9 −1.0 7.8
Low − High −20.1∗∗∗ −20.1∗∗∗ −21.1∗∗∗ −20.2∗∗∗
All −4.5 −1.8 −2.7∗∗∗ −2.3
(b) Manager changes in formation period (mgr cht−1, in percentage points)
Low 100 0 − 22
High 100 0 − 16
Low − High − − − −
All 100 0 − 19
(c) Fund size in evaluation period (TNAt, in million USD)
Low 554.3 724.1 −169.8∗∗∗ 689.3
High 430.9 717.7 −286.8∗∗∗ 672.9
Low − High 123.4∗∗∗ 6.4 −163.4∗∗∗ 16.4
All 493.6 696.2 −202.7∗∗∗ 681.0
(d) Fund size in formation period (TNAt−1, in million USD)
Low 688.6 861.3 −172.8∗∗∗ 826.1
High 374.1 612.0 −238.0∗∗∗ 575.4
Low − High 314.5∗∗∗ 249.3∗∗∗ 76.5∗∗ 250.7∗∗∗
All 547.2 712.1 −164.9∗∗∗ 700.4
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Table 7: Performance of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent for loser funds and the loser-fund subgroups as well
as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and
manager change. See the note to Table 3 for more explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− without
(a) Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Low −0.09 −0.18∗∗ 0.08 −0.15∗
High −0.28∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.26∗∗∗
Low − High 0.19∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.10∗∗
All −0.19∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.21∗∗
(b) Four-factor alphas in formation period (αt−1)
Low −0.90∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.91∗∗∗
High −0.88∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.88∗∗∗
Low − High −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
All −0.89∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.89
(c) Change in four-factor alphas (∆αt = αt − αt−1)
Low 0.81∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ − 0.75∗∗∗
High 0.60∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ − 0.62∗∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All 0.71∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ − 0.68∗∗∗
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Table 8: Raw returns of loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly raw returns in percent for loser funds and the loser-fund subgroups as well as
the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and
manager change. See the note to Table 4 for more explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− without
(a) Raw returns in evaluation period (rt)
Low 0.49 0.37 0.12∗∗ 0.40
High 0.28 0.29 −0.01 0.29
Low − High 0.21∗∗∗ 0.08 0.20∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
All 0.39 0.32 0.07∗ 0.34
(b) Raw returns in formation period (rt−1)
Low −0.35 −0.46 0.11 −0.44
High −0.28 −0.27 −0.01 −0.27
Low − High −0.07 −0.19 −0.08 −0.18
All −0.33 −0.38 0.05 −0.36
(c) Change in raw returns (∆rt = rt − rt−1)
Low 0.84∗ 0.83∗ − 0.84∗
High 0.56 0.56 − 0.56
Low − High − − − −
All 0.71 0.69 − 0.70
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Table 9: Standard deviations of loser-fund returns and loser-fund subgroup returns
This table presents the standard deviations of monthly returns in percent for loser funds and the loser-fund
subgroups as well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute
fund flows and manager change. Numbers in squared brackets ([.]) in panels (a) and (b) show the fraction of the
standard deviation explained by systematic risk according to the four-factor model, the remainder is explained
by idiosyncratic risk. See the note to Table 5 for more explanation.
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− without
(a) Standard deviations in evaluation period (Stdt)
Low 5.34 5.31 0.03 5.31
[0.85] [0.85] [0.00] [0.85]
High 5.42 5.40 0.03 5.40
[0.85] [0.86] [−0.01] [0.86]
Low − High −0.09∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.09∗∗∗
[−0.00] [−0.01] [−0.01] [−0.01]
All 5.37 5.38 −0.01 5.38
[0.85] [0.86] [−0.01] [0.86]
(b) Standard deviations in formation period (Stdt−1)
Low 5.49 5.43 0.07∗ 5.44
[0.86] [0.87] [−0.01] [0.86]
High 5.65 5.60 0.05 5.61
[0.86] [0.87] [−0.01] [0.87]
Low − High −0.15∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
[0.00] [−0.01] [−0.01] [−0.00]
All 5.55 5.56 −0.01 5.56
[0.86] [0.87] [−0.01] [0.87]
(c) Change in standard deviations (∆Stdt = Stdt − Stdt−1)
Low −0.16∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ − −0.12∗∗∗
High −0.22∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ − −0.20∗∗∗
Low − High − − − −
All −0.18∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ − −0.17∗∗∗
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Table 10: Performance of winner-minus-loser spread portfolios
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent for the winner- and loser-fund subgroups and the
resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager
change. Panel (a) reports details on the portfolio formation and panel (b) reports four-factor alphas. See the
note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio formation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the
regression coefficients.
Without equilibrium mech. Uncond. With equilibrium mech.
Neither No flows No manager − Manager ch. Flows only Both
change only
(a) Portfolio formation
Winner funds
Inflows low low − − − high high
Manager ch. without − without − with − with
Loser funds
Inflows high high − − − low low
Manager ch. without − without − with − with
(b) Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Winner 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.02 −0.06 −0.11
Loser −0.25∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.09
Winner − loser 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.09 −0.02
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Table 11: Peer-group adjusted returns of winner- and loser-fund subgroups
This table presents monthly peer-group adjusted returns in percent for winner and loser funds and the winner-
and loser-fund subgroups as well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based on independent
sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. Peer-group adjusted returns are defined as the difference
between fund i’s returns and the average returns of all peer-group funds P with the same fund style. The
following style groups exist in our sample (all U. S. domestic equity): cap-based funds large-cap; cap-based
funds mid-cap; cap-based funds small-cap; style funds growth; style funds growth and income; style funds
income; sector funds financial; sector funds health; sector funds natural resources; sector funds technology;
sector funds utilities; sector funds other, and other. See the note to Table 4 for more explanation.
(a) Winner funds: Peer-group adjusted returns (ri,t − rP,t)
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− with
Low 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.14
High 0.06 0.06 −0.01 0.06
Low − High 0.10∗ 0.03 0.10∗ 0.09∗∗
All 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.10
(b) Loser funds: Peer-group adjusted returns (ri,t − rP,t)
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− without
Low 0.04 −0.11 0.15∗∗∗ −0.07
High −0.15 −0.14 −0.01 −0.15
Low − High 0.19∗∗∗ 0.03 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
All −0.00 −0.13 0.08∗∗ −0.11
59
Table 12: Performance of winner- and loser-fund subgroups based on a ranking including the
active peer benchmark (APB) factor
This table presents monthly four-factor alphas in percent in the evaluation period for winner and loser funds
and the winner- and loser-fund subgroups as well as the resulting spread portfolios (in percentage points) based
on independent sorts on absolute fund flows and manager change. For ranking funds into decile portfolios, the
four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) has been augmented by an active peer benchmark (APB) factor in order to
control for the fact that estimation errors are potentially not independently distributed in the cross section of
funds as suggested by Hunter et al. (2014). See the note to Figure 1 for more explanation on the portfolio
formation and the note to Tables 2 and 6 for more explanation on row and column definitions. Panel (a) reports
the results for winner funds and winner-fund subgroups and panel (b) reports the results for loser funds and
loser-fund subgroups. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
(a) Winner funds: Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Net inflows Manager change
Without With Without All
− with
Low 0.13 0.23∗ −0.10 0.14
High −0.04 −0.06 0.01 −0.05
Low − High 0.17∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.19∗∗
All 0.05 0.09 −0.04 0.05
(b) Loser funds: Four-factor alphas in evaluation period (αt)
Net inflows Manager change
With Without With All
− without
Low −0.07 −0.16∗ 0.09 −0.14
High −0.29∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.25∗∗∗
Low − High 0.22∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
All −0.17∗∗ −0.21∗∗ 0.04 −0.20∗∗
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Table 13: Regressions for change in fund performance
This table presents the results of a 3SLS regression for the change in annualized Bayesian four-factor alphas on percentage points per annum between the formation
and evaluation years. The explanatory variables of model 1 are total net assets (TNA) in billion USD, fees in percent, fund age in years and portfolio turnover in the
previous year, two dummies that indicate whether the fund is currently in decile 10 or decile 1 based on previous year performance, respectively, relative fund flows for
previous year, an interaction term between fund flows and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummy, respectively, a dummy indicating whether the manager changed during the
previous year, an interaction term between a manager change and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummy, respectively. Model 2 additionally contains a dummy indicating
whether the fund is a small-cap or sector fund (SC/SEC) and an interaction term between fund flows into small-cap or sector funds and the decile-10 and decile-1
dummy, respectively. Model 3 additionally contains an interaction term indicating whether the manager change among decile-10 and decile-1 funds, respectively,
occurred in a large fund family. Model 4 additionally contains a dummy indicating whether the fund was ranked into decile 10, had higher-than-median flows and
a manager change during the previous year and a dummy indicating whether the fund was ranked into decile 1, had lower-than-median flows and a manager change
during the previous year. The instruments used for fund flows are lagged fund flows and lagged portfolio turnover as indicated by the Hansen J-test. The last row
present the number of observations. Funds are ranked into deciles based on their previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas. Following French (2008), we winsorize all
variables at the 1th and 99th percentile to avoid any bias resulting from extreme outliers.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
coeff. p-val coeff. p-val coeff. p-val coeff. p-val
constant 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.30 0.11
TNAt−1 (bn USD) −0.09
∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.00
feest−1 (%) −0.23
∗∗ 0.03 −0.19∗ 0.07 −0.19∗ 0.07 −0.19∗ 0.07
aget−1 (·100) −0.20 0.68 −0.26 0.60 −0.26 0.60 −0.30 0.55
turnovert−1 −0.10
∗ 0.06 −0.09 0.11 −0.09 0.11 −0.09 0.11
dec10t −7.10
∗∗∗ 0.00 −7.10∗∗∗ 0.00 −7.10∗∗∗ 0.00 −7.14∗∗∗ 0.00
dec1t 6.91
∗∗∗ 0.00 6.92∗∗∗ 0.00 6.92∗∗∗ 0.00 6.91∗∗∗ 0.00
flowst−1 −0.49
∗ 0.10 −0.52∗ 0.08 −0.53∗ 0.07 −0.51∗ 0.08
flowst−1 · dec10t −0.47 0.13 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.85 0.13 0.68
flowst−1 · dec1t −0.56 0.14 −0.46 0.31 −0.43 0.33 −0.27 0.54
style SC/SEC − − −0.17 0.14 −0.18 0.13 −0.18 0.13
flowst−1 · SC/SEC · dec10t − − −1.14
∗∗∗ 0.00 −1.14∗∗∗ 0.00 −1.14∗∗∗ 0.00
flowst−1 · SC/SEC · dec1t − − −0.23 0.64 −0.27 0.59 −0.21 0.68
mgr cht−1 0.31
∗∗ 0.03 0.31∗∗ 0.03 0.31∗∗ 0.03 0.32∗∗ 0.03
mgr cht−1 · dec10t −1.13
∗∗∗ 0.01 −1.10∗∗ 0.01 −1.14∗∗ 0.03 −0.16 0.80
mgr cht−1 · dec1t 0.47 0.27 0.48 0.28 −0.19 0.72 −1.72
∗∗∗ 0.01
mgr cht−1 · lfam · dec10t − − − − 0.13 0.87 0.18 0.81
mgr cht−1 · lfam · dec1t − − − − 1.84
∗∗ 0.02 1.90∗∗ 0.01
mgr cht−1 · hi flt−1· dec10t − − − − − − −2.17
∗∗∗ 0.01
mgr cht−1 · lo flt−1 · dec1t − − − − − − 2.86
∗∗∗ 0.00
# observations (fund-years) 28,816 28,816 28,816 28,816
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Table 14: Classification of investment objectives
This table presents the classification codes we have used to construct our sample. We use Lipper codes,
Wiesenberger codes and Strategic Insight codes (priority is given in this order if different codes assign funds to
different investment categories) in order to classify our funds into the following three groups: (1) Large- and
mid-cap funds (LMC), (2) small-cap funds (SC) and (3) sector funds (SEC).
Large- and mid-cap (LMC) Small-cap (SC) Sector (SEC)
Lipper CA, EI, EIEI, G, GI, I,
LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MC,
MCCE, MCGE, MCVE,
MLCE, MLGE, MLVE
SCCE FS, H, NR, S, SESE, TK,
TL, UT
Wiesenberger AGG, G, G-I, G-I-S, G-S,
G-S-I, GCI, GRI, GRO, I-
G, I-G-S, I-S, I-S-G, IEQ,
ING, LTG, MCG, S-G, S-G-
I, S-I-G, S-I, Ia
SCG ENR, FIN, HLT, TCH,
UTL
Strategic Insight AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO,
ING
SCG ENV, FIN, HLT, NTR,
SEC, TEC, UTI
a Note that Wiesenberger code I for income funds is not restricted to income equity funds but also contains
income money market funds, income bond funds etc. Consequently we use a combination of Wiesenberger code
I and policy code CS or I-S or Wiesenberger code I and an allocation to stocks of at least 50 percent as condition
for funds to be included in our sample.
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